Humanists are often interested in the
mind/body problem and wonder how our mental activities are connected
to brain activities. Humanists are often also interested in alcohol
and the effect that it has on mental/brain activity. This article
brings both interests together to see what happens.
On Having One Too Many
The striking feature of having one
too many (drinks, that is) is that you do not realise it yourself.
You think that you are still simply enjoying the euphoria which the
first couple of drinks brought you, whereas in fact you have long
passed the zenith and are now clearly (to everyone else) sliding
down into drunken incapacity. You are starting to slur your words
and are becoming too assertive and opinionated for comfort.
A few moments previously you were
in good spirits, literally, enjoying the banter and an
alcohol-induced frame of mind which could be called "heightened
sociability". In this state everyone at the table, yourself
included, seemed more than usually friendly and witty. Familiar
little anecdotes from everyday life provoked waves of merriment and
you felt very much at home in the group.
Such feelings demonstrate the
magical powers of alcohol. Undoubtedly it affects the chemistry of
the brain. In metaphorical terms, it was lubricating the
brain/mental processes and making everything run more smoothly. In
more literal terms, the alcohol was probably affecting the
connections between neurons, making them fire more easily and hence
more widely, thereby causing the kind of lateral thinking on which
so much humour depends.
The reference to causation in that
last sentence picks out the key feature of the process of drinking.
The alcohol causes changes in behaviour and mental states. It gets
into the brain via the blood stream and it changes the whole person.
And therein lies its philosophical interest, in that drinking is a
process which straddles the divide between the public arena of
bodily behaviour and the private arena of mental states.
What you experience is, initially,
simply a feeling of well being. "It makes you feel good" seems a
fair description and it is certainly one that the drinks advertisers
have tried to exploit. "Feel good" is a way of saying that you have
changed, without going so far as to say that you are now a different
person. It is still the same you, but you are now "in a different
mood" is another way to describe it. Applying the word "mood" has no
explanatory force, however. It is not an explanation, merely an
assertion that these changes of mental state do not amount to a
change of personal identity. A euphoric, three-glass you is still
you, but you are in a better mood than usual.
Unfortunately, when you are in a
state of euphoria it is only too easy to think that having another
drink will prolong that agreeable situation. Rationally, and
empirically, in the cold light of day, you know that euphorias do
not last and that having more drinks is guaranteed to bring this one
to an end. But you are in a state of euphoria and such cautionary
tales seem to you to be premature and pessimistic. The logic of
euphoria tells you that if two drinks have created your present
mood, then two more drinks will either intensify the feeling
twofold, or make it last twice as long, or perhaps even both.
So you have the two extra drinks
and you start to slur your words and to ramble your way
inconsequentially through stories for which either the punch-line
has been completely forgotten or, remembered, it seems a poor reward
for a long-winded narrative. It is at this point that the internal
logic of euphoria begins to fall out of step with the logic of
external physical reality. For you, nothing has changed, except that
the merriment no longer seems as general as it was: you are doing
most of the laughing at the end of your own stories. But that can be
interpreted euphorically to mean merely that you appreciated the
humour more distinctly, or that you were in a better mood than
everyone else.
To an external observer, however,
or to other members of your group who have not drunk quite so much,
the occurrence of slurred words and rambling stories with pathetic
punch-lines is evidence of a state of brain malfunction quite
different from that enjoyed earlier. What was a matter of degree has
now become a matter of distinct states. The change of quantity in
the physical world (ie. the alcohol) has produced a different kind
of change in the mental world.
It is no good saying that you are
still the same person. Bodily, that is true, with the exception of
the additional alcohol now coursing through your veins. But the
person, in whose company others now feel trapped, is quite
different: the genial socialite is now a drunken bum. A change in
mental state has occurred of which you, the person undergoing the
transformation, are quite unaware.
How is that possible? How can
mental states change without the knowledge of the mind involved? It
is tempting to say that brains are the key: we cannot see into our
own brains to see what state they are in, and even if we could, we
would not know what we were looking for. But brains are not
necessarily the answer. Even if we accept that a blood sample
indicates the amount of alcohol in the brain (a belief supported by
police breathalyser teams), it is surely logically possible for you
to have your blood sampled and then say, "I do not dispute the
reading, but I am not drunk. I am only euphoric."
That answer is logically coherent,
but, as the police breathalyser team would say, it does not prevent
you from being wrong. You are not euphoric; you are drunk. The
evidence is available to all: you slur your words, you think inane
remarks are uproariously funny and you have a tendency to fall over.
Your insistence on a fundamental dualism of mind and body such that
the mind is unaffected by bodily chemistry is clearly further
evidence of your impaired reasoning. Dualism has failed to do
justice to the situation. The evidence lies in your behaviour and
therefore a physicalist account of mental states in terms of bodily
actions must lie closer to the truth.
Has the person been dissolved then?
No, only a part of your brain. That desperate assertion, "I am only
euphoric," is mistaken, not only about the euphoria, but also about
the self making the mistake. Is there an "I" to which the drunken
incapacity is happening? Is there some still point in the vortex of
swirling impressions and sensations? Can the real you please stand
up? Of course not. You are drunk and your drunkenness consists of
slurring words, staggering around, falling over furniture, etc. And
that is all. What more could there be? A kernel of self which soars
above all that shambles? A little sober bit in the midst of all that
incoherent speech and mindless mirth?
In the words of the police
breathalyser team, pull the other one. There is no little sober bit.
You are drunk through and through. You are soaked. Plastered. You
think you are still the same self as before but you are in no fit
state to pass any judgment. Tomorrow when you see that ashen face in
the mirror and try vainly to remember what happened, then you will
know that you were not yourself and that the illusion of continuity
of identity was only that – an illusion. You were those disconnected
words, raucous laughs and inaccurate movements, but now in the cold
light of day you disown them, and accept that the present headachy,
nauseous and irritable self is the next stage in the series of you.
Or so you should, but old habits
die hard, and so you cling to the discredited illusions of
continuous identity. "What a fool I made of myself last night!" you
say ruefully. But that heroic acceptance of responsibility does not
prevent you from blaming the excess alcohol. The drink got the
better of you. It caused you to act as you did. It gave the orders
and you, in a state of diminished responsibility, carried them out.
So you say, "What a fool the drink made of me last night!" And the
truth of the matter lies in the connection between those two
exclamations, which you in the haggard chill of the morning are
reluctant to contemplate.
Les Reid
(is continuing his research into
alcohol, mental states and personal identity. Any person or
institution interested in funding this important work should contact
him via the Editor.)
This article first appeared in
Philosophy Now.